This article employs the relative deprivation theory in order to explain the formation of violent conflicts induced by an increase in economic inequality. By using the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the author attempts to illustrate how the rise in inequality, caused by changed economic structure, can be transformed into violence, often accompanied by material and human casualties. In addition to the theoretical framework, the article relies on empirical studies carried out by using relative deprivation as a starting point. Finally, the author observes indications that inequality-induced conflicts could soon take place in developed and developing countries, which is why new models of development and economic policies must be implemented and thus used as conflict-preventing mechanisms.
Introduction
Numerous confl ict studies have led to the creation of a corpus of knowledge which has revealed the need to take into account the complexity and multidimensionality of confl icts, while examining the underlying causes leading to violence. This, among other things, means that it is not possible for a confl ict to be fully understood (and thereby resolved) unless all potential causes are considered. Therefore, multi-causality may imply the simultaneous existence of several different causes (political, religious, ethnic, etc.) . The cases of Nigeria during the 1960s and Rwanda in the mid 1990s, where ethnic confl icts were also stimulated by unequal access to political institutions and the different economic position of belligerent actors, may be used as possible examples. On the other hand, complexity may imply that confl ict is motivated by a group of abutting reasons, whether political, social or any other. Weak or failed states in which (along with the inexistence of state authority on their complete territory) the access to central government for certain groups is withheld represents one of the possible examples (Somalia or DR Congo). Furthermore, it is necessary to consider and research phenomena (and processes) whose activity creates confl ict potential that, under certain conditions, can lead to the emergence of incompatibilities between the actors, and thereby have the outbreak of violence as its consequence.
Socio-economic factors have been taken into consideration in confl ict research since the beginning of the 1980s, when researchers started showing interest in the analysis of direct economic causes (natural resources, GDP growth, tax and revenue systems, etc.), as well as in the economic phenomena that could have possible confl ict potential, among which, one of the most important is economic inequality (Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002) .
The end of the Cold War broadened the above-mentioned fi eld of analysis, while, since the early 21st century, the problem of economic inequality has started to gain a central position in the research on causes of violent confl icts. There are two reasons for this change. The fi rst is given by the inequality itself, which nowadays has reached its historical maximum, both on a national and a global level. Income inequality is on average one-third higher than it was in the previous century. In certain cases (ex-USSR countries), the inequality has doubled during the last three decades, while in the most drastic examples (PR of China) it is three times higher (Cornia, 2003) . On a global level, the situation is similar. Here the ratio of the wealthiest compared to the poorest countries (20 per cent of them) has worsened four times in the last half of the century (from 1:20 to 1:80) (Rivero, 2010; Milanović, 2006) .
The second reason for the increased interest in researching economic inequalities is given by the disappearance of corrective mechanisms present for most of the previous century. With the change in the economic model, which started in the late 1970s and became global with the end of the Cold War (through the model of neoliberalism), the mentioned mechanisms have completely disappeared. Due to this change, inequalities began to grow dramatically, thereby additionally intensifying the already very high confl ict potential. In these conditions, economic inequalities ceased to be only latent and became a manifest cause of violent confl icts. That is why their examination today is one of the priorities for peace and confl ict researchers.
The analysis of economic inequalities also provides an opportunity to act towards their prevention. Authors like Gurr assert that the time gap between the manifestation of a specifi c cause and its transformation into a violent confl ict is at least ten years, which offers an opportunity to establish effective prevention strategies. In the case of economic inequalities, the formulation of such strategies would have a dual infl uence. On the one hand, the importance of economic factors in the escalation of violence would decrease, while parallel to that, it would act towards confl ict prevention (Burton, 1990) .
Relative Deprivation Theory
In the research on economic inequalities as causes of confl ict, relative deprivation represents a theoretical framework which may contribute to better understanding the relatedness of the two phenomena. This is done primarily by emphasizing socio-psychological characteristics of individuals, i.e. the frustration that arises in them due to the discrepancy between the actual and expected situation. The standpoint derives from Dollard et al. (1939) , who believed that frustration is a necessary element for violence to occur. Frustration, in their opinion, appears when an individual is prevented from achieving a certain goal, which is followed by a disturbed psychological balance and tension that can be released only by aggression directed towards the cause of the frustration or (if he/it is not accessible) some other, alternative target. The hypothesis was later altered with the attitude that frustration creates readiness for aggression but only under certain conditions (Berkowitz, 1972 , cited in Vasović, 2007 violence is fi rst development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and fi nally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence" (Gurr, 1970, pp. 12-13) .
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With regard to the economic values, Gurr states that if they are rigid over a longer period of time and people live on the edge of survival, every (even marginal) deterioration of the economic situation may lead to the outbreak of violence. As the most important economic parameters (for creating deprivation) he identifi es: increased unemployment, infl ation, and change in the system of production. The fi rst two parameters are the most important because they represent the main causes of increase in income inequality (Cornia, 2010) . Support for these claims is found in research conducted by Gurr (1968) on a sample of 114 states, which showed that 20 per cent of all confl icts are caused by economic decline or economically related factors with the defi nite conclusion that reduction in economic capabilities in part of the population leads to an increasing danger of outbreak of violence.
Similar fi ndings can be found in Abeles' (1976) research on the relationship between African Americans' beliefs about economic inequality and black militancy, or Walker and Mann's (1987) analysis of the correlation between the number of unemployed Australians and the frequency of social unrest in this country (Tyler and Lind, 2001: 46) .
It should also be noted that, in Gurr's view, economic factors could generate confl icts only to a certain extent. An unfavourable economic situation encourages people to be violent, but not when the material position is such that it compels individuals to struggle for their psychical subsistence, i.e. when they are at the "starvation threshold". If that is the case, the likelihood of outbreaks of violence declines rapidly, or, in the words of Hobsbawm (1959, p.79) , "when people are really hungry they are too busy seeking food to do much else; otherwise they die from hunger".
Patterns of deprivation
Gurr recognizes three patterns of deprivation, which all may have a part in the emergence of violence. Decremental deprivation appears when value expectations within a group are constant (or vary only slightly) over a long period of time, while value capabilities decline substantially.
In this pattern of deprivation, confl ict is created because people are not
capable of achieving what they once were and what they would like to achieve. Confl icts mostly emerge because of the creation of decremental deprivation.
This form of deprivation usually emerges because of a decline in the production of material goods, the unwillingness of political elite to resolve confl icts, foreign infl uence or loss of confi dence in the society integration mechanisms. Decremental deprivation may also emerge when a group loses access to scarce resources (for example progressive taxation on the wealthy or the loss of political infl uence).
Decremental deprivation is also a potential explanation for the relation between inequalities and confl icts, since it emerges as a consequence of changed circumstances. In the case of economic inequalities, change can be linked to the introduction of a new, neoliberal model which led to a drastic increase in income polarization due to excessive trade liberalization and market deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s (Cornia, 2003) . In that situation many individuals who had previously been capable of attaining a certain quality of life were subsequently unable to do so. In
Gurr's words, this means that value expectations stayed the same, but capabilities substantially decreased, which may lead, if such tendencies continue, to the induction of decremental deprivation and subsequent eruption of violence. The stated explanation can be applied both to developed countries in periods of crisis (for example Greece or Spain) and to middle-developed countries (Eastern Europe) that underwent these exact changes during their transition.
In addition to the loss of resources, decremental deprivation may also emerge due to a decline in certain opportunities, for instance with regard to employment or education. This is also an important factor because, to an increased level of frustration which can be transformed into confl ict.
In the case of aspirational deprivation, value expectations are substantially increased without any increase in capabilities for their fulfi lment.
Individuals or groups who are undergoing aspirational deprivation have not experienced any loss, but frustration emerges because they cannot attain new, notably higher expectations. These expectations may be related to goods they already possess or they never had before (for example political participation in former colonial administrations).
Aspirational deprivation may be an appropriate theoretical framework for explaining the emergence of confl icts in developing countries (former Third World). Economic opening has enabled these countries to reach high economic growth, but at the same time it has also considerably increased the inequalities (for the examples of China and India whose record levels of economic growth are followed by a dramatic increase in income inequality, see Milanović, 2007) . In such circumstances individuals have higher expectations due to the overall progress that is being achieved, but they do not have the ability to fulfi l these expectations since it is limited to a very small group of people (this is very close to Horowitz's [1985] concept of ranked groups consisting of subordinate and super-ordinate subgroups with restricted mobility). As in the case of decremental deprivation, education and employment play important parts since they are constricted to a limited number of citizens, diminishing in that way the opportunities for the rest of population. A situation of this kind can be more dangerous than decremental deprivation because a larger number of people are affected (due to the large populations in developing countries) and thereby prospects for confl ict outbreak are higher.
Progressive deprivation occurs when during a prolonged period of time both value expectations and capabilities evenly increase because of the constant progress. If, after a long period of growth, a sharp decline in capabilities occurs, progressive deprivation may appear. Examples of progressive deprivation are usually found in societies that have gone through ideological and systemic changes (for instance, a period of economic depression in growing economies like the one in South Asia in 1997). This type of deprivation may also be useful when formulating theories of revolution by asserting that political violence occurs as a consequence of an inappropriate response of social structures to objective changes.
In the case of politically deprived confl icts, decremental and progressive deprivation show wider applicability than aspirational deprivation. When it comes to confl icts induced by economic deprivation the situation is somewhat different, since aspirational deprivation can be used to explain the formation of most of the confl icts, which is not completely plausible for decremental deprivation. Progressive deprivation is not fully applicable in explaining economic deprivation (in contrast to the political one) due to the nature of economic values which rarely imply a constant growth of capabilities and even less so with a parallel increase in expectations.
It should be noted that Gurr believes that, over time, people tend to adapt their expectations to their capabilities, which is why the discrepancy is usually a temporary phenomenon. Individuals show the ability to make value capabilities closer to their expectations, or, if that is not possible, to lower expectations to the level of their capabilities. However, in the case of very high expectations, the equalizing effect takes years, decades or even generations. This is because people quickly obtain the habit of expecting more than their social capabilities allow, but they also get easily frustrated when available means prove to be insuffi cient and they become aware of their own limitations (Gurr, 1970) .
Empirical Research Overview
Empirical studies based on the relative deprivation hypothesis have tried to confi rm (by using statistical and econometric methods) the theoretical assumptions regarding the relation between economic inequality and confl icts. Although it is not a theory that inspired a large number of empirical studies (like, for example, the theory of resource mobilization), the obtained results are signifi cant since they confi rm the assertions that relative deprivation may be an incentive for violent confl icts.
The fi rst research is the one conducted by Sigelman and Simpson (1977) who, by using econometric analysis, tried to confi rm three hypotheses, one of which directly favours the correlation between economic inequality and confl ict, while the other two confi rm (or disprove) the fi ndings regarding the relatedness between relative deprivation and confl icts. It should be noted that the authors examined not only the way in which the wealth is distributed, but also a number of other factors, such as the overall wealth available for distribution, the social and cultural diversity of the population, and the rate at which social change occurs. As indicators they used unequal distributions of income (individual), political violence, social mobility (number of enrolment quotas for educational institutions), cultural diversity, speed of social change (increase in number of inhabitants in cities with a population greater than 100,000 people), size of population and growth of GDP. The sample consisted of 49 countries and included 40 per cent of the world's population, which was, according to the authors, an adequate representation of the world's heterogeneity.
The results confi rmed hypothesis (1), asserting the correlation between the inequality in national income and political violence, although the impact of the inequality proved to be rather moderate. No evidence was found that would substantiate initial claims for the second and third hypotheses.
Research even showed a negative correlation between confl ict and the average level of the world's Gini coeffi cient (44.8 at the moment of research) as well as Gini 50 (stable economy). Hypothesis (3), claiming that a confl ict is most likely to occur when the differences are at their highest or lowest point, was also unverifi ed. The introduction of additional indicators did not change the situation signifi cantly.
Though the research did not detect a high level of correlation between economic inequalities and confl icts, it is signifi cant since it empirically proved the relation between two phenomena, and, even more importantly, it proved that relative deprivation can be used to explain the confl icts induced by economic inequalities. 7 The authors concluded their research with a note about the importance of examining different types of inequalities, and the relations between them, which is especially signifi cant since the interconnection with cultural, political and social inequalities can foster, or even prevent, the formation of confl icts caused by high economic polarization (cumulative or cross-cutting effect).
Another research, conducted by Alesina and Perotti (1996) , examines the relations between an increase in economic inequalities and political instability, which is very broadly defi ned and embraces: politically motivated murders, the number of people killed in internal turmoils (with respect to total population), successfully and unsuccessfully executed coups d'état, as well as the frequency and freedom of elections. This is why research on political instability is analysed in respect of the claims about causality between economic factors and of violent confl icts introduced at the beginning of the paper.
The research was carried out on a sample of 71 states in the period and it confi rmed the initial hypothesis that economic inequality instigates discontent which can subsequently lead to socio-political instability (and an increased possibility of coups d'état, revolutions, political violence, etc.), and fi nally result in fewer investments and decreased economic growth.
Based on the results, the authors conclude that economic inequality and investments are negatively correlated, which is why it is possible to explain why some countries of the Far East, which had implemented agrarian reform and reduced economic inequality, have attracted more foreign investments, and achieved political stability and high economic development, in contrast to regions such as Latin America where inequalities remain in place, thus preventing economic development.
The research conducted by Nafziger (1999, 2002 ) is of crucial importance for the analysis of the economic inequality-violent confl ict relation based on the relative deprivation hypothesis. The reason why complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) may be related to violent confl icts can be found in their operational defi nition which describes emergencies as man-made crises characterized by extensive human suffering and life loss, physical violence and displacement, frequently followed by widespread disease and hunger. CHEs are not just rare occurrences, but rather the culmination of continuous political and economic decay (which often lasts for decades) of the state in question.
The main argument for grounding research on the relative deprivation hypothesis is that during this phase economic inequalities become explicitly visible, and therefore potentially more dangerous. In other words, relative deprivation is more important than absolute deprivation since short-term changes in economic status can have a much stronger infl uence on individuals than long-term fl uctuation during which individuals can accustom themselves to a newly created situation and, by doing so, manage to avoid frustration. Furthermore, absolute deprivation does not offer a full explanation regarding the relationship between economic stagnation and a consequent lack of social cohesion (see Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999) .
The fi rst research (1999) 8 An increase in relative deprivation does not necessarily lead to an increase in absolute deprivation. Stable economic development (no absolute deprivation) can be followed by unequal distribution (most probably due to a lack of redistributive mechanisms) which can lead to the formation of relative deprivation among individuals in the lower strata of the income scale.
Both researches also included other economic factors such as stagnation or decrease in GDP, infl ation and food production. Like Collier and Hoeffl er The authors' conclusion is that complex humanitarian emergencies are directly caused by economic factors (inequality, infl ation, GDP, military expenditures), while the history of preceding confl icts may have an infl uence on the formation and intensity of crises. Based on the results, the authors observe that developing countries need a change in their policy which will include more incentives for economic growth, the introduction of good governance, limitation (or if plausible prevention) of arms traffi cking and the introduction of mechanisms for the prevention of shocks caused by deterioration in terms of trade.
Finally, the research of MacCulloch (2005) 
Conclusion
Throughout the better part of the 20th century, states kept imposing economic systems that implied regulatory, but also redistributive mechanisms. The welfare state in Europe, the model of import-substitutions industrialization (ISI) in Latin America, the command system in the countries of the Socialist Bloc, the Third World development model (in Asia and Africa) and the US economy based on Keynesian principles were all able to restrict market forces, if it seemed necessary. Because of this, short-term increases in income inequality did not have social consequences since governments had instruments which could maintain the inequalities at a socially acceptable level. This is why, for the better part of the previous century, the economic factors were not considered to be a root cause of violent confl icts.
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9 MacCulloch defines revolution in terms of violent disruption of political systems and institutions which leads to an outburst of hostility that is often similar or identical to violent conflict.
Since the end of the 1970s, the above-mentioned systems have gradually been replaced, mainly by introducing a neoliberal model which became globally dominant by the beginning of the 1990s. In the new model, the redistributive mechanisms lost the importance they previously had, which is associated with the core values upon which the system rests.
Neoliberalism upholds extensive and widespread privatization, followed The dramatic increase in inequality has not only economic, but social consequences as well. Among these consequences, one of the most important is certainly the increased confl ict potential. However, the way in which inequalities lead to the outbreak of violence may be interpreted differently. In this paper emphasis is put on the theory of relative deprivation which stresses the importance of frustration induced by the variance between the expected and the actual situation. The choice was made based on the author's belief that this theoretical viewpoint is completely applicable to economic parameters, especially to income inequalities and the subsequent incapability of individuals to achieve the desired level of welfare which creates a strong feeling of deprivation within them. That also coincides with the neoliberal model which (through its activity) continuously widens the discrepancy between these two positions (expected and actual). The additional importance of the theory in question is given by the numerous empirical studies, like those about complex humanitarian emergencies.
By uniting qualitative and quantitative indicators, the relative deprivation theory clearly demonstrates that a dramatic increase in income inequality may generate great discontent in individuals, which, under favourable conditions, may lead to the outbreak of violence. This is not only the case on the intra-state level, but on the inter-state and regional levels as well. In a world where social polarization is becoming the rule rather than the exception, the change of paradigm is of essential importance.
